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Remedies is about the intersection of things.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Remedies do not fit neatly into law’s boxes. Remedies as a legal 
subject matter is complex. It cuts across categories—the topic is trans-
substantive by nature. Further, within the field, specific remedies often 
defy categorization. For example, certain remedies, such as restitutionary 
disgorgement, may straddle the law-equity divide. To complicate the 
inquiry of this article more, Remedies lies at the intersection of procedure 
and substance. Remedies connects substantive fields and delivers any 
ultimate entitlements—or their monetary substitute—to the winning 
claimant. 
It is no wonder that remedies in individual cases pose significant 
challenges to any simple application of the Erie analysis.2 Remedies are 
neither procedure nor substance except when they are.3 Remedies aid 
substance and require procedure to deliver on plaintiff’s substantive 
1. Caprice L. Roberts, Teaching Remedies from Theory to Practice, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 713, 
713 (2013). 
2. See Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 217, 219 (2018)
(“[M]any remedies issues fit awkwardly at best within the Erie framework.”). 
3. A related point is that the size of the right is a part of the right. Tunks, Categorization and 
Federalism: “Substance” and “Procedure” After Erie Railroad v. Tomkins, 34 ILL. L. REV. 271 
(1939); WALTER WHEELER COOK, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 163–65 
(1942). For helpful considerations of the substance-procedure divide, explore the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflicts. Consider also the choice-of-law treatment of remedies as procedural, but this 
frame does not inherently govern in the Erie context. See SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CHOICE OF LAW 
69, 72 (2016) (explaining that remedies are classified as procedural rather than substantive for choice-
of-law purposes, but also noting that analysis is “not necessarily” the same when determining “the 
line separating procedure for ‘Erie purposes’”). See also RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON 
THE CONFLICTS OF LAW 59–62 (5th ed. 2006) (explaining that the determination of whether a rule is 
substantive or procedural in the conflict-of-law context requires balancing the forum’s difficulty in 
applying the foreign rule against the probability of affecting the case’s outcome and encouraging 
forum shopping). Accordingly, proceed with caution: “Matters of ‘substance’ and matters of 
‘procedure’ are much talked about in the books as though they defined a great divide cutting across 
the whole domain of law. But, of course, ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ are the same key-words to very 
different problems. . . . Each implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for 
which it is used.” Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945). 
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entitlements. But where exactly do remedies fit? In searching a law library 
for Dobbs’ original Remedies treatise, the entire treatment may well be 
housed under “Procedure.”4 Why? A relic of the development of the 
subject of Remedies as a course?5 Or due to its precursor course, Equity?6 
Or based on the roots of equitable jurisdiction versus a court of law? Or a 
result of intentional or accidental line-drawing by courts after Erie? 
But what is in a label anyway?7 Even the Supreme Court quickly 
recognized the shortcomings of assuming labels lead to definitive 
classifications.8 For that reason, the Court has suggested focusing on 
Erie’s driving purpose—uniformity—and developed the outcome-
determinative test.9 Yet, that test is not the end of the story, at least when 
it comes to equitable remedies. 
It is a mistake to assume that Remedies as a field does not contain its 
own doctrines and goals. It does. But the principles of Remedies may 
conflict or parallel the underlying substantive law of the cause of action.10 
If conflict arises, federal court treatment of remedies doctrines under Erie 
has heightened import. 
II. REMEDIES AND OUTCOMES
After all, the remedy that a court grants is the “outcome” of the 
case.11 
The Supreme Court in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins proclaimed that a 
federal court exercising jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship must 
follow state law.12 This edict of Erie applies with equal force to 
4. It would be interesting to conduct a library survey for classification of the Remedies
treatise. I found Dobbs’s initial edition under “Procedure” at the Lawton Chiles Information Center 
at the University of Florida’s Levin College of Law. 
5. See generally Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG.
161 (2008) (examining the development of the modern American law of remedies). 
6. Id. 
7. The law-equity determination cannot be based on choice of labels. See, e.g., Dairy Queen
v. Wood, 36 U.S. 469, 476–79 (1962) (refusing to permit plaintiff’s selection of an accounting remedy 
and characterization as purely equitable govern the constitutional right to a jury trial). 
8. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). 
9. Id.; see also John T. Cross, The Erie Doctrine in Equity, 60 LA. L. REV. 173, 173 (1999)
(“Recognizing that the terms substance and procedure are mere labels, the York Court analyzed the 
question in light of the purpose of Erie, which was to ensure uniformity in result between federal and 
state courts.”). 
10. Roberts, supra note 1, at 713. 
11. Cross, supra note 9, at 174. This quote is more controversial for remedies that precede a
trial on the merits such as preliminary injunctions. Still, a federal court’s grant of preliminary relief 
may well be the first and last word of the case. OWEN M. FISS & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 
(2d ed. 2001). 
12. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
3
Roberts: Remedies, Equity & <i>Erie</i>
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
496 AKRON LAW REVIEW [52:493 
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.13 Erie’s primary holding 
represented a complete break from the reasoning of Swift v. Tyson14 that 
had countenanced the development of “federal general common law.”15 
The guiding force behind Erie and its preservation to date remains the 
interest in uniformity.16 
The Court further interpreted Erie in Hanna v. Plumer to direct 
federal courts to resolve choice-of-law issues by applying federal law to 
procedural issues and state law to substantive issues.17 The unanimous 
decision emphasized federal judicial authority under The Rules Enabling 
Act to control its own practice and pleading procedures.18 According to 
the Court, the federal service-of-process rule at issue fell within the 
Enabling Act power.19 This procedural power is explicitly limited, 
however, by the constitutional right to a jury trial: “Such rules shall not 
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve the 
right of trial by jury.”20 The Court reasoned that the procedural rule did 
not violate any constitutional requirements.21 Due to conformity with the 
Enabling Act and the Constitution, the Court determined that the federal 
service rule was the proper standard to apply in a case sitting in diversity 
jurisdiction,22 notwithstanding that such a procedural difference would be 
outcome-determinative.23 
Despite Erie’s underlying value,24 the Hanna Court concluded: “To 
hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease to function 
13. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988) (ruling that Erie applies to the same extent as
diversity when federal courts exercise pendent jurisdiction over state-based claims). 
14. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
15. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
16. Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival of Federal Common Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 
966, 974 (1946) (reasoning that states courts hearing cases involving federal law must carry out Erie’s 
“main theme” of uniformity by applying federal law if a federal court would have applied federal 
principles to resolve the issue). 
17. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464–65 (1965). 
18. Id. at 464 (citing The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958)). 
19. Id. at 463–64. 
20. Id. at 464 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958)). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 468–69.
24. Yet, outcome-determinativeness is not Erie’s sole value: “The ‘outcome-determination’ 
test therefore cannot be read without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of 
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of justice.” Id. at 468. Justice Harlan’s 
concurring opinion in Hanna laments the oversimplification of all of these tests for proving too much; 
instead  
the proper line of approach in determining whether to apply a state or a federal rule, 
whether “substantive” or “procedural,” is to stay close to basic principles by inquiring if 
the choice of rule would substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human 
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whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to 
disembowel either the Constitution’s grant of power over federal 
procedure or Congress’ attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling 
Act.”25 Hanna provides a proper pedigree route to the choice between a 
federal and state prescription. For example, pursuant to Hanna’s rationale, 
a valid federal rule, such as Federal Rule 65 for injunction procedure, 
governs in federal cases under diversity jurisdiction. Still, finding the 
proper balance between federal and state law and the exact line between 
substance and procedure is often debatable.26 
What of equity? Twenty years before Hanna, the Court revisited 
Erie’s command in the context of equity.27 In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 
the plaintiff sought an equitable accounting remedy and claimed the right 
to sue under a New York statute that provided beneficiaries the power to 
sue their trustees.28 Defendant argued the arrangement was not a trust, and 
that the federal court sitting in diversity should dismiss the suit based on 
the state’s statute of limitation.29 The Second Circuit ruled that laches was 
a matter of remedy rather than right such that federal law must apply.30 
The Supreme Court reversed and applied state law to block the matter.31 
Yet in its reasoning, the Supreme Court refined Erie’s reach and 
clarified federal equity power. It reasoned that traditional, federal 
principles of equity must continue despite Erie’s disdain for federal 
common law.32 Equity was unique and special, and its power traced back 
to the English Court of Chancery.33 In fact, the Court explained that a 
federal court sitting in diversity as an alternative forum to the state court 
conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulations. If so, Erie and the 
Constitution require the state rule prevail, even in the face of a conflicting federal rule. 
Id. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
25. Id. at 473–74. 
26. In Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996), the Court examined the 
federal district court’s posture sitting in diversity but also confronting the federal constitutional right 
to jury trial. Pursuant to Erie, the lower court looked to New York state law for how to assess 
excessiveness of damages; specifically, it applied a New York statute mandating the judge review the 
verdict for “material deviation” from reasonable compensation. Id. at 425. The Supreme Court 
reasoned that the state law at issue “contains a procedural instruction, but the State’s objective is 
manifestly substantive.” Id. at 429. 
27. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109. 
28. York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 511 (2d Cir. 1944). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 522–23. 
31. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 112.
32. Id. at 104. 
33. Id.; see also Morley, supra note 2, at 218 (discussing and critiquing the “so-called equitable 
remedial rights doctrine” as unfounded and otherwise problematic). 
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may “afford an equitable remedy not available in a State court”34 as long 
as within the federal court’s traditional equity power35 and not otherwise 
constitutionally or congressionally restricted.36 Ultimately, the Court 
reasoned that despite caselaw characterizing such rules as remedial and 
procedural,37 the state statute’s complete barrier to recovery aligned more 
with a right than a remedy: it would “so intimately affect recovery or 
nonrecovery” such that the federal court in diversity jurisdiction must 
follow the state bar.38 Still, York’s broader rationale carving out space for 
federal courts to render equity interpretations when sitting in diversity 
remains. “Dicta” will continue to “be cited characterizing equity as an 
independent body of law.”39 Though brooding omnipresent equity is now 
“replaced by a shaper analysis of what federal courts do when they enforce 
rights that have no federal origin,”40 independent federal equity continues. 
John Cross explored and confirmed the justifications for the equity 
exception to Erie.41 He acknowledged that equity is an accident of 
history.42 Ultimately, however, he demonstrated sufficient reasons for 
equity to be treated differently than Erie convention dictates.43 Though 
the outcome may be different, Cross concluded that federal courts must 
garner significant discretion in the interpretation and application of 
equitable procedure, remedies, and defenses.44 This logic remains enticing 
despite risks of undermining Erie and underappreciating state 
prerogatives. 
Doug Rendleman provides a useful reexamination45 of the powerful 
charge that equity had gone too far in swallowing the common law as 
advanced in Steve Subrin’s seminal work, How Equity Conquered the 
34. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 105. 
35. Id. (noting the restrictions on equity relief in federal court including “the suit must be within 
the traditional scope of equity as historically evolved in the English Court of Chancery” and “a plain, 
adequate and complete remedy at law must be wanting.”). 
36. Id. (detailing other restraints including that Congress may restrict equity powers and that
any exercise of federal equity power may not violate the constitutional right to a jury trial). 
37. Id. at 109 (“It is therefore immaterial whether statutes of limitation are characterized either 
as ‘substantive’ or ‘procedural’ in State court opinions in any use of those terms unrelated to the 
specific issue before us.”). 
38. Id. at 110. 
39. Id. at 112 (“To the extent that we have indicated, it is.”). 
40. Id. (distinguishing modern federal equity after Erie from older sweeping notions). 
41. Cross, supra note 9. 
42. Id. at 232. 
43. Id. at 231–32. 
44. Id. at 174. 
45. Doug Rendleman, The Triumph of Equity Revisited: The Stages of Equitable Discretion, 
15 NEV. L.J. 1397 (2015). 
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Common Law.46 Subrin decried the expansion of equity at the expense of 
the common law.47 For example, he criticized the breadth of equity’s 
conquest over the common law by creating new rights in more relaxed, 
dynamic ways.48 Subrin, however, did not call for the eradication of 
equity, but rather, for revitalization of the common law and its 
adjudicative tools.49 In revisiting Subrin’s work, Rendleman thoughtfully 
explores the nature of equity and the “stages of equitable discretion.”50 
Rendleman details the pathway of a hypothetical nuisance case in 
federal court under diversity jurisdiction.51 He examines earlier charges 
regarding the problems of “on-the-spot” decisionmaking and amorphous, 
unmoored discretion of equity determinations.52 But, discretion abounds 
in procedure, equity, and beyond.53 Rendleman ultimately seeks 
balancing; he warns that courts should not exceed their power with 
“unprincipled discretion” hidden behind the cloak of equity’s “ancient 
language.”54 
The modern dilemma, in my opinion, is how to retain the historical 
power and flexibility of equity while maintaining limits to ensure the use 
of reasoned discretion. Only then55 will we make the most of the federal 
courts increasing remedies-diversity docket. 
46. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). 
47. Id. at 1001 (“The total victory of equity process has caused us to forget the essence of civil 
adjudication: enabling citizens to have their legitimate expectancies and rights fulfilled.”).  
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 1001–02. 
50. Doug Rendleman, supra note 48, at 1410–50. 
51. Id. at 1400, 1409. 
52. Id. at 1410–50. 
53. Id. at 1405. 
54. Id. at 1450. 
55. A counterargument is to simply view all of equity and law as one system and move forward, 
especially if one thinks the specialness of equity is greatly exaggerated and over mythologized. See 
generally Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53 (Summer 1993). 
Still, the Supreme Court has maintained the distinction between law and equity. Rendleman, supra 
note 48, at 1404. Equity maintains its magnetic pull. 
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III. FEDERAL EQUITY POWER56
Federal equity power arises from Article III57 and the Judiciary Act 
of 1789.58 According to Laura Fitzgerald, the Act “authorized the federal 
judiciary to develop for itself a uniquely federal law of equity.”59 Within 
this power,60 federal courts maintain the ability to discern equitable 
procedures, remedies, and defenses.61 The power is delicate and must not 
be abused. Federal courts should be careful to articulate its bases of power 
and their boundaries.62 
Even a strong view of federal equity power, however, does not mean 
that such power should lack restraint. Federal jurists themselves must 
exercise restraint. Justice Stone advanced this stance and relied on 
principles, precedent, institutional bounds, and federalism as compelling 
limits.63 Equity has always been perceived as, and remains, “a potentially 
dangerous but nonetheless essential judicial power.”64 Federal courts must 
exercise this power of equity carefully, as unbridled discretion diminishes 
respect for the rule of law generally. 
IV. THE STAYING POWER OF EQUITY
The law-equity divide remains vital for Seventh Amendment, for 
defenses, and more. Some scholars lament the persistence of equity and 
call for further fusion.65 Two primary counterarguments exist on 
56. For an in-depth examination of the history of the federal court equity power, see Kristin A.
Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law in the 
Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249 (2010). See also Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable 
Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530 (2016). 
57. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
58. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92. 
59. Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1263 (2001). 
60. For a thoughtful exploration of the complex and evolutionary history of judge-made law
and the federal court equity power as a “story of change,” see generally Collins, supra note 59. 
61. Cf. Morley, supra note 2, at 220 (maintaining the assertion of federal equity power
“exceeds . . . the scope of federal courts’ Article III judicial power,” as well as “federalism-based 
limits on the federal government’s power as a whole”).  
62. Controversy surrounds claims of inherent federal court powers. See, e.g., Amy Coney
Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324 (2006) (suggesting 
the Supreme Court’s power to prescribe procedural rules for lower federal courts lies more in 
constitutional supremacy than Article III’s grant of inherent authority). 
63. Gary L. McDowell, A Scrupulous Regard for the Rightful Independence of the States:
Justice Stone and the Limits of the Federal Equity Power, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLICY 507, 511, 515, 
519 (1984). 
64. Id. at 507. 
65. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 53 
(1993); Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, 
27 REV. LITIG. 63 (2007). 
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descriptive and normative grounds. The first is that complete fusion is 
unattainable because of the constitutional lines of demarcation. The 
United States Constitution66 and state constitutions67 explicitly 
distinguish law from equity for the purposes of providing constitutional 
rights to jury trials in certain civil cases. History also supports rationales 
for distinct treatment.68 The second counterargument is that equitable 
remedies, doctrines, and defenses comprise a distinct, historical system 
and that it is one worth maintaining.69 
Is federal equity power as exercised pursuant to Guaranty Trust a 
problem? Michael Morley, examining equitable injunctions under Erie, 
concluded that federal equity power to develop uniform doctrines is 
unauthorized.70 He laments the extent to which Guaranty Trust thwarts 
Erie’s purpose of ending the development of general common law by 
federal courts: “Despite Erie’s purported abolition of general law and 
relegation of federal common law to a few distinct areas in which federal 
interests predominate, equity lingers as a vestigial ‘brooding 
omnipresence’ that may dictate the results of diversity and supplemental 
jurisdiction cases.”71 Morley ultimately recommends finishing what Erie 
started with respect to dismantling general law by eliminating “the 
lingering remnants of the old federal equity power.”72 His suggestion 
would give substantial power to states to develop the doctrines of 
procedure and remedies doctrines in addition to the existing authority to 
dictate substantive law. Benefits include finishing the merger effort and 
eliminating anachronistic, confusing categories. Many of Morley’s 
critiques have traction, but his conclusion is less persuasive. He asserts 
that federal courts deem all remedies “categorically substantive”73 despite 
any arguments of the mixed procedural and substantive nature of 
remedies.74 
66. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
67. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 22; GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, ¶ 11; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
68. Cf. Morley, supra note 2. 
69. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, supra note 59. 
70. Morley, supra note 2, at 220, 278 (maintaining that nothing in federal law, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, or the Constitution “authorizes federal courts to craft and apply a uniform 
body of equitable principles, including equitable remedial principles, to all claims that come before 
them, regardless of the source of law from which a claim arises.”).  
71. Morley, supra note 2, at 249. 
72. Id. at 279. 
73. Id. at 263. 
74. Id. (“Some scholars contend that remedies exist in the hazy hinterlands between the much 
more familiar realms of ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ rights. Whatever the merits of such arguments, 
remedies should be deemed substantive under the Erie Doctrine.”). 
9
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As a Federal Courts professor as well as Remedies, I am protective 
of federal court power and domain, though cognizant of limits by 
constitutional design as well as the import of judicial restraint. My 
protective stance makes me wary of Morley’s overall project, though one 
cannot ignore certain valid critiques he raises such as the anachronistic 
and confusing nature of the law-equity divide. On whole, however, I 
conclude that federal courts have the constitutional, historical, and 
precedential power to develop federal equity doctrines and remedies. 
Federal courts, however, can and should vigilantly respect state’s domain 
with respect to substantive doctrines as best it can. The reason for courts 
to hedge the best they can is to acknowledge that the line between 
procedure and substance and law and equity are not always clear. 
In a follow-up piece,75 Morley reinforces his prior position. He 
examines the conflicting treatment between federal and state courts on 
what he deems similar elements.76 He argues that courts must look beyond 
the listed elements to the underlying body of precedent.77 He maintains 
that state law should control equitable remedies, as they do state 
substantive causes of action.78 According to Morley, this result should 
occur without a litigant proving the issue is outcome determinative.79 
Rather, federal courts should reach the Erie analysis.80 Morley calls for 
overturning the Supreme Court’s precedent on the Erie exception for the 
development of federal equity: “Guaranty Trust’s equitable remedial 
rights doctrine should be discarded.”81 
Federal courts are capable and tasked with drawing those lines. Take 
Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.82 It directs federal courts 
on the procedure to be followed when analyzing a motion for an 
injunction. Generally, federal rules govern procedure, while state law 
governs substance.83 This distinction persists despite friction with 
75. Michael T. Morley, Beyond the Elements: Erie and the Standards for Preliminary and
Permanent Injunctions, 52 AKRON L. REV. 455 (2019). 
76. Id. at 478-88. 
77. Id. at 488-490 (analogizing to “pierc[ing] the veil” to discern the body of precedent the
elements represent). 
78. Id. at 468.
79. See id. at 489 (“A court should not require litigants to affirmatively demonstrate that
competing bodies of equitable remedial principles may lead to different results before engaging in an 
Erie analysis.”). 
80. Id. at 479, 489. 
81. Id. at 471. 
82. FED. R. CIV. P. 65. 
83. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464–65 (1965) (defining procedure as “the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering 
10
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methods of enforcing state-created rights.84 And even though the 
procedures of the federal system and state vary.85 Federal courts, 
including the Supreme Court, have developed caselaw interpreting the 
broader doctrines to be met when seeking such an equitable remedy in 
federal court. Shouldn’t state law be relevant to that determination if the 
federal court’s jurisdiction hinges on diversity? But it is relevant through 
application of the federal factors, and this respect for state substantive law 
strikes a proper balance. The federal court would look to Rule 65 and 
federal precedent such as eBay, but when considering one of the federal 
injunction factors—the likelihood of success on the merits—the federal 
court properly examines state law on the potential merits of the underlying 
state cause of action. 
To the extent we determine that controversial uses of remedies need 
adjustment, federal rules must be able to reach and shape the behavior. 
Imagine we change Federal Rule 65 to combat the perceived rise and 
perhaps abuse of the so-called nationwide86 injunction, as Sam Bray has 
proposed.87 It is imperative that any federal court, whether the case arises 
under federal law or falls under diversity jurisdiction, would need to 
follow any new constraints. If instead the federal court completely 
deferred to state law on such standards as injunctions, then Congress’s 
power to remedy federal court overreaching via remedies in federal cases 
would be undermined if not eliminated. Yet, Article III plainly intends 
extensive federal congressional authority over federal court power. 
V. FEDERAL COURTS SITTING IN DIVERSITY HANDLING REMEDIES 
The existing balance of powers is not broken. Maintaining the 
existing system is worth it even if some inconsistencies, some 
overreaching, and some gray areas persist. Such flaws suggest reforms 
should be moderate rather than radical. Of course, checks on power 
remain wise, but sufficient checks already exist. Litigants and their 
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them” and noting that congressionally proscribed 
rules must conform to the power granted by the Rules Enabling Act). 
84. See id. at 473 (“To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure must cease to function
whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be to disembowel either the 
Constitution’s grant of power over federal procedure or Congress’ attempt to exercise that power in 
the Enabling Act.”).  
85. Id. 
86. The nationwide label is a misnomer. See, e.g., Howard Wasserman, “Nationwide” 
Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunctions and They Are Never Appropriate: On the Scope of 
Injunctions in Constitutional Litigation, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335 (2018). 
87. Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. 
REV. 417 (2017). 
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lawyers help ensure proper consideration of relevant state doctrines. 
Federal appellate courts provide opportunities to review the appropriate 
balance between federal and state law. Another formidable way to alter 
the balance are the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and any necessary 
amendments. 
Federal courts sitting in diversity generally do and should apply 
federal equitable remedies standards. For example, take a request for a 
preliminary injunction in federal court considering a state law claim under 
diversity jurisdiction. The federal standards for preliminary injunctions 
should apply.88 Of course, there are federal courts sitting in diversity that 
have not looked to federal standards when determining equitable 
remedies.89 
Consider a few examples showing how federal courts sitting in 
diversity or evaluating supplemental state-based claims regularly and 
effectively balance federal procedure with state substantive law. The cases 
may reflect imperfection in citation choices, but overall, federal courts 
generally achieve a healthy balance of honoring Erie, developing federal 
equity under Guaranty Trust, and respecting state prerogatives when 
approaching substance. 
For example, a federal district court evaluating a request for a 
preliminary injunction, sought to balance Florida state law on contracts 
with federal standards for injunctive relief.90 Regarding the preliminary 
88. See David E. Shipley, The Preliminary Injunction Standard in Diversity: A Typical
Unguided Erie Choice, 50 GA. L. REV. 1169 (2016); see also Bethany M. Bates, Note, Reconciliation 
After Winter: The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions in Federal Courts, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1522 
(2011); DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES—CASES & MATERIALS 125 
Comment 4 (9th ed. 2018). 
89. See, e.g., Charles Simkin & Sons v. Massiah, 289 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1961) (plaintiff sought
injunctive relief, essentially “equitable replevin,” to get equipment returned, yet judge cited only New 
Jersey state-court opinions on the remedy standards); see also RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 
88, at 1181–83. On the concept of injunctive relief as equitable replevin, see Von Hecke, Equitable 
Replevin, 33 N.C. L. REV. 57 (1954). 
90. Fla. Panthers Hockey Club, Ltd. v. Miami Sports & Exhibition Auth., 939 F. Supp. 855
(S.D. Fla. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Florida Panthers v. City of Miami, 116 F.3d 1492 (11th Cir. 1997). 
The Florida Panthers case also included federal antitrust counts, though one of defendant moved to 
dismiss that count on immunity grounds and another defendant planned to file a motion to dismiss. 
Id. at 856 n.1. Based on the antitrust claims, Plaintiff asserted federal question as the basis for 
jurisdiction with supplemental jurisdiction over the state law breach of contract claim. Given the 
motion to dismiss, the federal court held the antitrust counts in abeyance and thus considered only the 
state law breach of contract claim when it considered Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. 
Id. Though “where the jurisdiction of the federal court depends on a federal statute, the evils which 
the Erie doctrine was designed to prevent are not present, and so the same need does not exist for 
requiring the federal court to follow state law.” Exceptions to Erie, supra note 17, at 970. Still, the 
principles of Erie loom over the supplemental state law claim. Regardless, the federal court’s 
injunctive relief discussion remains useful to see how the federal court honors state doctrines versus 
12
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injunction standard, the federal district court cited federal circuit and 
district court cases.91 This method stayed intact for both the burden and 
the elements of the injunctive relief sought. But as the court drifted toward 
the potential strength of the underlying claim,92 it cited Florida state court 
cases.93 For the proposition raised by defendant that specific performance 
will not lie for personal service contracts, the federal court cited both a 
federal and a state case.94 Perhaps the court simply cited both by virtue of 
defendant’s pleading and to note that both federal and state law support 
defendant’s assertion. The court reasoned, however, that the blackletter 
barrier was not applicable to the type of contract at issue. It determined 
that the equitable remedy of specific performance should be available 
where the underlying sports contract amounted to “a lease agreement” 
because “such an agreement may be subject to specific performance.”95 
The court cited no case law for this determination, but opted to close the 
analysis on this point with a recognition of state law boundaries for the 
availability of specific performance for certain types of contractual 
obligations. The remainder of the court’s analysis on the likelihood of 
federal law where the cause of action at issue is a state-based contract claim seeking equitable 
remedies (preliminary injunction that would achieve specific performance of the contract). See also 
DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION 
643 n.112 (citing Arias v. Solis, 754 F. Supp. 290 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Lewis v. Rahman, 147 F. Supp. 
2d 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). In Arias v. Solis, the federal court, sitting diversity jurisdiction, approved 
court power to enforce negative covenant upon finding of uniqueness. Arias, 754 F. Supp. at 290. It 
cited to both state and federal cases. Id. at 293–95. The court relied solely on federal rules and federal 
cases to rule that plaintiff satisfied the proper amount-in-controversy for diversity jurisdiction; it did 
so without assessing comparative merits of substantive claims. Id. at 292–93. It relied on federal rules 
and federal cases for consideration of the requisite security bond for the injunction and determined 
the federal court maintained discretion in setting the amount. Id. at 295–96. Similarly, in Lewis v. 
Rahman, the federal court, sitting in diversity jurisdiction, equitably enforced negative employment 
covenant causing the boxer to put his career on hold for eighteen months. Lewis, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 
225. The court cited to New York caselaw on contract liability, id. at 233–35, but it analyzed federal 
precedent on injunctive power and relief. Id. at 237–38. Interestingly, the court entertained 
defendant’s citation to a New York case on lack of mutuality but concluded the doctrine was 
inapplicable. Id. at 237. Note that the citation of federal cases does not necessarily translate into 
reliance on federal principles. Often the citations are to federal cases that also sat in diversity 
jurisdiction and themselves included citation to state and federal precedents. This blended approach 
shows comity while also permitting federal courts to enunciate and interpret the boundaries of its 
equity power while cognizant of state maxims. 
91. Fla. Panthers, 939 F. Supp. at 858–59 (citing cases from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida). 
92. The specific analysis falls under Part III.A of the court’s opinion entitled, “Substantial 
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success on the merits focused on the contract language at issue without 
citation to any caselaw.96 For the other injunction factors, the court cites 
to federal case law. 
Overall, the Florida Panthers court balanced its consideration of 
federal caselaw on equity standards with a nod to state law on contract 
law. It may be that the court did more than it needed to, given that the 
point for which it cited state law was also an equitable remedies doctrine 
related to specific performance. There is no Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure on the point. Federal cases exist, and the court cited those as 
well as a state case.97 This blend shows comity for the state’s doctrines 
that touch on how the substance of contract law ties to equitable requests 
for relief like specific performance where the whole point is to order the 
defendant to do exactly what the contract promises. 
Perhaps the Florida Panthers court would have been wise to cite 
only federal precedent on the basis that federal law governs not just 
federal procedure but also requests for equitable remedies per the Erie 
exception created by Guaranty Trust. Simply because federal courts have 
the power to develop federal equity does not mean that federal courts must 
toil in the interpretive field alone. Further, if the equitable remedy is closer 
to the ground—meaning closer to the underlying body of substantive state 
law—federal courts are wise to not ignore a robust body of law already 
developed by the state 
This dynamic is likely true for the specific performance remedy for 
state law breach of contract claims. Federal doctrines of equity generally 
align with state doctrines of equity regarding the availability of specific 
performance. Alignment makes the absence of citation less problematic. 
Even in well developed areas of doctrine, however, variations can 
develop. For example, a federal court very familiar with the eBay line of 
cases might interpret the Court’s reasoning to show general disdain for 
any presumed factors in the quest for any equitable remedies; meanwhile 
a state court might continue to presume uniqueness and irreparability for 
certain contracts like real estate. 
How do federal judges handle choice of law regarding consideration 
of legal remedies in cases in federal court under diversity jurisdiction? 
Are the principles of Erie and its progeny frustrated when federal courts 
technically follow Erie by ultimately acknowledging the state’s 
substantive law but provide an opinion filled with dicta on how the sitting 
federal judge would treat the remedy? In other words, what if the judge 
96. Id. at 858–59. 
97. Id. at 858. 
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uses the federal moment to signal and shift jurisprudence of the 
underlying state? A detour with now retired Judge Posner will show artful 
attempts in dicta to influence the state’s substantive law. Are such signals 
permissible under Erie? Beyond the federal court’s Article III power? If 
within the federal court’s power, are such federal pockets of reasoning 
wise? At minimum these opinions raise federalism concerns. 
Take Mindgames, Inc. v. Western Publishing Co.98 Plaintiff 
Mindgames alleged that Defendant Western Publishing Company 
breached the contract for failing to promote Plaintiff’s board game, Clever 
Endeavor.99 Plaintiff sought expectancy damages in the form of 
anticipated royalties that would have flowed had Defendant not breached 
the contract.100 The Mindgames contract included a choice of law clause 
in favor of Arkansas.101 Sitting in diversity, the federal district court relied 
upon a 1924 Arkansas case102 to rule that the new business rule barred 
plaintiff from recovering any lost profits thus dictating summary 
judgment for defendant.103 Judge Posner, considering the appeal on behalf 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sidesteps 
Arkansas law and instead inserts his own views in order to propel the 
jurisprudence toward a standard rather than an outmoded rule that bars 
recovery to new businesses.104 
Judge Posner reasons that the Arkansas Supreme Court, if presented 
with the opportunity to review its 1924 precedent, would reconsider the 
prohibition and instead adopt a more lenient standard.105 According to 
Judge Posner, “[t]hat is the best prediction in this case.”106 Judge Posner 
rejects the state of Arkansas’s bright-line prohibition to recovery for all 
new businesses.107 Instead, he endorses a more fluid standard that permits 
the recovery of lost profits for a new venture as long as the evidence is not 
unduly speculative.108 Under the standard, he then determines that 
plaintiff failed to establish the reasonable degree of certainty required.109 
98. Mindgames, Inc. v. Western Publishing Co., 218 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2000); see also 
RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 88, at 820–27; Victor P. Goldberg, The New Business Rule and 
Compensation for Lost Profits, 1 CRITERION J. INNOVATION 341 (2016). 
99. Mindgames, 218 F.3d at 653. 
100.  Id. at 654. 
101.  Id. at 653. 
102.  Marvell Light & Ice Co. v. General Elec. Co., 259 S.W. 741 (Ark. 1924).  
103.  Mindgames, 218 F.3d at 655. 
104.  Id. at 656. 
105.  Id. at 658 (“Abrogation of the ‘new business’ rule does not produce a free-for-all.”). 
106.  Id. at 656. 
107.  Id. at 658. 
108.  Id. 
109.  Id. at 659. 
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Plaintiff’s lack of a track record establishes the speculative nature of 
proving lost royalties.110 Also, Judge Posner views Plaintiff as the least 
cost avoider in that it made no efforts to distribute the game by other 
means, which Judge Posner sees as “telling evidence of a lack of 
commercial promise unrelated to Western’s conduct.”111 Ultimately, 
Plaintiff loses despite the more favorable standard that Judge Posner 
adopts.112 
Judge Posner not only predicts what the Arkansas high court would 
do if it reexamined its precedent on the new business rule, but then also 
rules as a matter of law that Plaintiff fails to meet the freshly adopted 
standard of reasonable certainty. The dissenting judge called for a remand 
of the issue because the appellate court “cannot say on this record, as a 
matter of law, that Mindgames cannot prove to a reasonable certainty that 
Western’s failures to perform, if proved, caused a loss of sales.”113 
Compare the judicial restraint showed by the federal district court 
judge in Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co.114 Plaintiffs filed a 
class action seeking medical monitoring for fear of developing cancer 
after exposure to toxins but before succumbing to any disease or physical 
injury from the exposure.115 Judge Goodwin expresses explicit disdain for 
the relaxed substantive standards in West Virginia law regarding the 
remedy sought.116 He rules that Plaintiffs’ medical monitoring claim 
survives because West Virginia law has recognized a cause of action to 
recover such costs if proven “necessary and reasonably certain to be 
incurred as a proximate result of the defendant’s tortious conduct.”117 But 
Judge Goodwin shows reasonable methods for registering skepticism 
110.  Id. at 658. 
111.  Id. at 659. 
112.  Goldberg, supra note 98, at 361 (“MindGames is a classic case of a plaintiff winning the 
battle but losing the war.”). To add insult to injury, plaintiff’s failure to seek nominal damages 
squandered its chance to receive an attorney fee award under Arkansas’s prevailing party in a breach 
of contract action. Id. (citing MindGames, 218 F.3d at 654). 
113.  Mindgames, 218 F.3d at 660 (Fairchild, J., dissenting). 
114.  Rhodes v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co., 657 F. Supp. 2d 751 (S.D. W. Va. 2009). 
115.  Id. 
116.  See id. at 775. Judge Goodwin traces the Supreme Court’s developing jurisprudence on 
fear of cancer claims. He then cites and explains precedent contrary to West Virginia’s despite a 
similar claim. He explains that the Michigan high court denied a relief for medical monitoring where 
plaintiffs alleged injuries were ‘‘wholly derivative of a possible, future injury rather than an actual, 
present injury.’’ Id. (quoting Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 691 (2005)). Judge Goodwin 
appreciates the policy concern the Michigan court expressed regarding the alternative universe in 
which a limitless pool of plaintiffs arises. Id. He also cites scholarly works that support the Michigan 
approach and criticize West Virginia’s stance. Id. 
 117.  Id. at 773–74 (quoting Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 431 (W. Va. 
1999) (cleaned up)). 
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while following Erie by applying a state substantive rule that he deems 
dubious. He emphasizes the judicial binding within which he finds 
himself sitting in diversity jurisdiction: “I am bound to apply West 
Virginia substantive law in this diversity case.”118 
In contrast, Judge Posner in Mindgames shows far less deference in 
content and tone. Judge Posner is more brazen in his approach: he again 
offers pages and pages of his federal circuit reasoning but in the final 
disposition notes the Erie constraint and offers that state law—albeit on 
different grounds—leads to the result he reaches. Could Judge Posner’s 
opinion in Mindgames be an aberration? 
Consider Judge Posner again in two negligence cases involving 
attempts to recover purely economic losses: Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank 
Corp.119 and Rardin v. T & D Machine Handling, Inc.120 Most 
jurisdictions handle such a problem in one of two ways: either bar the 
claim under the common law economic loss rule121 or allow plaintiff to 
proceed to the jury if plaintiff can show defendant owed a special duty 
rendering plaintiff’s lost profits within the proximately caused harms122 
pursuant to Palsgraf.123 Judge Posner finds these traditional paths 
intellectually unsatisfying, so he offers a contractual path to resolve these 
non-contracts cases. Despite the lack of privity and lack of a breach of 
contract claim, Judge Posner uses the federal platform to lobby for 
curtailing these rippling waters124 of injury by the more limiting contract 
 118.  Id. at 775 (“Accordingly, I must apply the cause of action for medical monitoring 
recognized in Bower.”). 
 119.  Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 
(1982). 
120.  Rardin v. T & D Machine Handling, Inc., 890 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 121.  See, e.g., Local Joint Exec. Bd., Culinary Workers Union v. Stern, 651 P.2d 637, 638 (Nev. 
1982) (applying the “well established common law rule” to bar recovery in negligence for purely 
economic loss “absent privity of contract or an injury to person or property”); Trans-Gulf Corp. v. 
Performance Aircraft Servs., Inc., 82 S.W.3d 691, 695 (Tex. App. 2002). Cf. Tiara Condo. Ass’n, Inc. 
v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 110 So.3d 399 (Fla. 2013) (limiting economic loss rule’s application to
application only in the products liability context).  
 122.  See, e.g., J’aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979) (rejecting common law 
economic loss rule in favor of tort duty and foreseeability analysis); Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 
576 (W. Va. 2000); E. Steel Constr., Inc. v. City of Salem, 549 S.E.2d 266 (W. Va. 2001). 
123.  Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
124.  Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969): 
While it may seem that there should be a remedy for every wrong, this is an ideal limited 
perforce by the realities of this world. Every injury has ramifying consequences, like the 
ripplings of the waters, without end. The problem for the law is to limit the legal 
consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree.  
See also RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 88, at 703–04 (quoting the same and exploring the 
justifications for the common law bar to recovery of purely economic losses in negligence). 
17
Roberts: Remedies, Equity & <i>Erie</i>
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
510 AKRON LAW REVIEW [52:493 
principles of Hadley125 foreseeability. Once under a Hadley frame, 
plaintiff will not have communicated with defendant the prospect of 
consequential damages at the time of contracting because plaintiff did not 
enter into a contract with defendant. Accordingly, Judge Posner distills 
the Hadley-based analysis down to who is the least cost avoider. Then, to 
not much surprise, he finds that plaintiffs in both of the cases were in a 
better position at the front to prevent the losses suffered.126 
All the while, Judge Posner skips over any state law precedent, offers 
a new standard, and analyzes the facts under the new standard to reach his 
preferred conclusion. The lower federal court in the Evra case followed 
Illinois state law and entered judgment for the plaintiff for the economic 
losses proximately caused by the defendant.127 After examining a choice 
of law issue between Illinois and Switzerland, the federal trial judge in a 
bench trial determined that Plaintiff satisfied Illinois negligence law for 
recovery of its lost profits in the amount of $2.1 million plus attorney 
fees.128 In the appellate proceeding, Judge Posner leaves open the choice 
of law question as unnecessary because he views the recovery of 
Plaintiff’s lost profits unattainable under Illinois law. But as soon as Judge 
Posner begins on the merits of the claim, he cites a non-Illinois case and 
a non-contracts case: Hadley.129 Judge Posner later cites Illinois cases, but 
they are contracts cases and he uses them to show Illinois approval of 
Hadley.130 He does not show Illinois rejection of the negligence cases and 
doctrines cited by the lower court. On the merits, Judge Posner reverses 
Plaintiff’s lost profits recovery. He does not return to a consideration of 
state law or any real assessment of the district court judge’s reasoning 
under tort law. Instead, Judge Posner confidently concludes that the matter 
is clear under the principles he analyzed as framed under Hadley. He does 
not mention Erie; presumably he may have assumed his citation of Illinois 
contract cases showed all the deference state law required. For Judge 
Posner, Plaintiff’s award of lost profits is a clear-cut loser: “We could 
remand for new findings based on the proper legal standard, but it is 
unnecessary to do so. The undisputed facts, recited in this opinion, show 
125.  Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. 1854). 
126.  Evra, 673 F.2d at 957; Rardin, 890 F.2d at 28. 
127.  Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 522 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (awarding lost profits 
caused by defendant’s negligence in failing to wire money in timely fashion), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, rev’d in part, 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982). 
128.  Id. 
129.  Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. 1854). 
130.  Evra, 673 F.2d at 956. 
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as a matter of law that Hyman-Michaels is not entitled to recover 
consequential damages from Swiss Bank.”131 
In Rardin, Judge Posner doubles down on his Hadley contractual 
pathway into negligence claims for pure economic losses. Plaintiff in 
Rardin was less fortunate than in Evra: Plaintiff lost in the lower court. 
On appeal, Judge Posner once again explores Hadley at length and then 
reinforces his reasoning and ruling from Evra. He begins with citation to 
federal cases, but eventually reaches Illinois caselaw. Fortunately, this 
time he cites to tort cases on point that stand in favor of the common law 
economic loss rule, which creates a barrier to recover for purely economic 
loss cases.132 At minimum, he could have saved all the dicta on his 
preference for contractual limitations for torts in the commercial context. 
Ultimately, Judge Posner stops just short of ignoring state law 
doctrine. At the close of Rardin, Judge Posner gives a nod to the substance 
of state law regarding the remedial doctrine.133 He shows a modicum of 
restraint in acknowledging that it is the job of the Supreme Court of 
Illinois rather than the Seventh Circuit to resolve the regrettable state of 
the law: “[T]hat is a task for the Supreme Court of Illinois rather than for 
us in this diversity case governed by Illinois law.”134 But Judge Posner is 
resourceful in the end. He finds a way to reach the same result he seeks—
to foreclose Plaintiff’s opportunity for recovery of pure economic loss for 
a negligence claim in a commercial setting: “It is enough for us that 
Illinois law does not permit a tort suit for profits lost as the result of the 
failure to complete a commercial undertaking.”135 Judge Posner justifies 
his “protracted analysis” as “necessary to address the parties’ 
contentions,” even though the parties did not raise Hadley foreseeability 
as the standard to resolve the disputes. He offers that his contractual 
reasoning “underscores the desirability—perhaps urgency—of 
 131.  Id. at 959. Cf. Morin Bldg. Prods. v. Baystone Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413, 416–17 (7th Cir. 
1983) (Posner, J.) (noting that diversity jurisdiction obligates the court to interpret Indiana’s common 
law of contracts and then, after much speculation on the proper contract interpretation of a satisfaction 
clause, deferentially declaring: “When in doubt on a difficult issue of state law, it is only prudent to 
defer to the view of the district judge, here an experienced Indiana lawyer who thought this the type 
of contract where the buyer cannot unreasonably withhold approval of the seller’s performance.”). 
 132.  Judge Posner does not address that the plaintiff in question suffered injury to property. 
Plaintiff did not sue to recover that injury because Plaintiff settled with the party with which it held 
privity. The contract, however, contained a limit on liability against consequential damages. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff sued for pure lost profits from the negligent subcontractor with whom Plaintiff 
lacked privity.  
133.  Rardin, 890 F.2d at 30. 
134.  Id.. 
135.  Id. 
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harmonizing the entire complex and confusing pattern of liability and 
nonliability for tortious conduct in contractual settings.”136 
Though Judge Posner ends the opinion with a pivot back to 
recognizing the Erie constraint of Illinois law, the damage is done. This 
assessment is true even if Judge Posner’s analysis is an improvement to 
traditional treatment of pure economic loss cases under tort law. The 
reason why it is damaging is not about the merits of the arguments he 
makes. Rather, it is whether the federal court has exceeded its authority 
by demonstrating a lack of respect for the state supreme court’s authority. 
Whatever the federal judge’s intellectual views, the reasoning must begin 
with a good-faith exploration of the existing state precedent on the 
remedies doctrine in question. Instead, Judge Posner charges directly into 
lengthy alternative analysis, and he leaves jurisprudential breadcrumbs for 
the next federal court sitting in diversity to consider the topic. By the time 
he hits his next opportunity to address a similar case, he is able to cite and 
discuss the prior Seventh Circuit case as if it is precedent, even though 
state law should have led the inquiry all along. No surprise that the federal 
court cites to Rardin and Hadley (including the least cost avoider) rather 
than Palsgraf or the common law economic loss bar.137 Of course, the 
underlying states can reject the analysis or admonish Judge Posner for his 
attempts to alter treatment of such cases to a contractual rather than 
tortious plane, but any opportunity for dialogue must await a relevant case 
to reach the state high court. 
Federal district courts are playing an increasingly important role in 
the development of common law.138 One cannot expect to learn what the 
state of blackletter law is by examining and counting only state high court 
decisions.139 Scholars lament the hollowing out of common law.140 
Meanwhile, law professors increasingly focus on public and specialized 
areas rather than core doctrinal areas of private law. As long as judges are 
honest about discussing state law precedential constraints and 
prerogatives, it is valuable to permit federal judges to develop equity. 
State precedents gather dust while more state-based claims arrive in 
136.  Id. 
 137.  Valenti v. Qualex, Inc., 970 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming summary judgment against 
pure economic loss claim brought for negligence handling of film processing). 
138.  Richard L. Revesz, The Director’s Letter, Restatements and Diversity Jurisdiction, 40 
A.L.I. REP. No. 4 (Fall. 2018), at 1. 
 139.  Id. at 3 (emphasizing that “simply counting how many state supreme courts adopted a 
particular rule will not do the trick”). 
 140.  Samuel Issacharoff & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, The Hollowed Out Common Law (Oct. 
10, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3261372 [https://perma.cc/2TXR-
NLLX]. 
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federal court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, removal, and supplemental 
jurisdiction. Federal court interpretations of equity will be central to 
equity’s success. Ideally, federal judges will exercise this power wisely. 
But what if federal judges interpreting equity do so in a manner 
potentially inconsistent with state preferences? The Erie doctrine seeks to 
ensure uniformity. Yet, significant disformity exists.141 Uniformity is a 
worthy goal, but it is elusive across broad swaths of cases involving 
various remedies. Discretion may well cut against pure uniformity and 
equity inherently involves more judicial discretion. The import of Erie 
may be a reminder that our goal remains: treating like cases alike, 
especially as it translates to rights. Yet, Guaranty Trust carves out space 
for federal court development of equity and that development may not 
align with state doctrines. As discussed below, horizontal uniformity will 
exist if federal courts oversee federal equity, but some vertical disformity 
may arise. 
As long as the federal judge is cognizant of the distinct treatment and 
provides principled reasoning for the federal path, disformity may be 
tolerable and worth it. Disformity may be palatable if it is just enough to 
give care to cases but not so much as to generate hyper-forum shopping. 
Is a gray area preferred or a blended approach? 
VI. PARTICULAR PROBLEMS THAT FEDERAL COURTS FACE REGARDING
REMEDIES 
A. Elusive Categorization Problems—Disgorgement and Hybrid 
Remedies 
What if a remedy fails to fit neat categorization? Certain remedies 
defy consistent categorization as equitable versus legal. For example, 
courts have treated disgorgement inconstantly. Sometimes the 
characterization is driven by statute. But other times, the remedy is 
attendant to a common-law, state-based claim. Some courts look to 
disgorgement’s historical proximity to the equitable remedy of 
accounting.142 Yet, disgorgement of profits may tie more closely to legal 
 141.  See, e.g., Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 87, at 421 (“Our system already tolerates 
a substantial amount of legal disuniformity” by state courts and lower federal courts); Sharon K. 
Sandeen, The Myth of Federal Uniformity in IP Law, 24 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 277 (2017). 
 142.  See, e.g., Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1057 (2015); Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 617 F.2d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 1980) (“Restitution for the disgorgement of unjust enrichment is an 
equitable remedy with no right to a trial by jury.”); United States v. Rx Depot, Inc., 438 F.3d 1052, 
1054 (10th Cir. 2006) (disgorgement as equitable remedy for FDCA violation); Castrol, Inc. v. 
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restitution when used as a remedy for opportunistic breach of a contract 
and may warrant the constitutional right to a jury trial.143 State law would 
govern liability issues and the requisite intent threshold, and the remedy 
under such a characterization. But if disgorgement is equitable, then a 
federal judge sitting in diversity can determine whether and how much to 
award. Is the question of whether a remedy is equitable or legal a matter 
of state or federal law?144 
What happens in cases where a federal court issues or approves a 
remedy that defies clear classification, or is otherwise novel, due to their 
hybrid nature? A couple examples include remedies in fear of cancer cases 
and remedies involving comprised chattels of fluctuating value. Like the 
Judge Posner examples, these cases often involve intense use of 
pontification and signaling, but ultimately apply state law on the right and 
the remedy. Though the remedy is sometimes undertheorized. 
Fear of cancer cases are fraught with peril, even where liability lies. 
The conundrum arises because the more one reconceptualizes the harm, 
the more likely that remedies may flow to one class of borderline plaintiffs 
while another more serious class may arise later when the money runs 
dry.145 In one perplexing case, a federal district judge reluctantly allowed 
a medical monitoring claim to survive without a showing of present 
physical injury.146 The district judge, sitting in diversity jurisdiction, 
bristled at having to apply questionable state-law precedent.147 Still, the 
court felt bound by Erie to permit the stretching substantive law,148 which 
in turn opened up the avenue to the novel remedy of medical monitoring. 
Pennzoil Quaker State Co., 169 F. Supp.2d 332 (D.N.J. 2001) (disgorgement as equitable under the 
Lanham Act); Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 784, 785, 789 (D.N.J. 1986). 
 143.  See, e.g., SEC v. Lipson, 278 F.3d 656, 662–63 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Disgorgement is a form 
of restitution, as Judge Friendly noted . . . and restitution, as we have noted in several non-SEC cases, 
is both a legal and an equitable remedy.”); George P. Roach, A Default Rule of Omnipotence: Implied 
Jurisdiction and Exaggerated Remedies in Equity for Federal Agencies, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 1, 48 (2007) (maintaining disgorgement may be either equitable or legal). Cf. Robert M. Langer, 
John T. Morgan & David Belt, 12 CONN. PRAC., UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES § 6.9 (2018) (exploring 
the complexity of categorizing disgorgement). Regarding the right to a jury trial for legal restitution 
generally, see First Nat’l Bank of DeWitt v. Cruthis, 203 S.W.3d 88 (Ark. 2005). 
 144.  For example, if the claim is a state common law breach of contract, then state law should 
determine if request for legal versus equitable for the purposes of right to a jury trial. But, if the jury 
trial right exists, federal jury protocol would apply for empaneling the jury. 
 145.  See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 170–81 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 146.  Rhodes v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 657 F. Supp. 2d 751, 776 (S.D. W. Va. 2009), 
aff’d in part, dismissed in part, 636 F.3d 88 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 147.  Id. at 774–75 (detailing contrary precedent but noting what West Virginia law required per 
Erie). 
 148.  Id. at 775 (“I am bound to apply West Virginia substantive law in this diversity case. [citing 
Erie]. Accordingly, I must apply the cause of action for medical monitoring recognized in Bower.”). 
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When exploring the remedy, plaintiffs and federal courts show the 
complexity of the hybrid remedy. Toxic tort claims for medical 
monitoring abound on the state and federal level.149 Plaintiffs pursue 
varied remedies including legal monetary lump-sum awards,150 injunctive 
orders,151 or hybrid requests for court involvement in funding or a voucher 
system.152 
A federal appellate court confronted a thorny remedies problem 
regarding the conversion of stocks.153 Louisiana law governed the 
appropriate “measure of damages”154 for this tort of conversion. The 
appellate court cited Louisiana law to resolve the matter,155 but noted, 
pursuant to federal caselaw, that it must show “great deference . . . to a 
district judge’s interpretation of the law of his or her state.”156 The typical 
conversion measure is the fair market value at the time and place of 
conversion, but this measure may well fall short when the property 
fluctuates in value, as this case shows. Ultimately, the federal appellate 
artfully interpreted the spirit of the Louisiana “elderly” and analogous 
cases to find remedial discretion, which enabled it to approve the district 
court’s novel solution: ordering the defendant to “procure and deliver” the 
quantity and type of stock wrongfully converted.157 Maybe the court 
viewed it as a proxy for replevin (though the later property is not 
plaintiff’s original property)? New York would have solved the 
measurement issue by granting the tort victim the highest market value 
 149.  See, e.g., Herbert L. Zarov, Sheila Finnegan, Craig A. Woods & Stephen J. Kane, A 
Medical Monitoring Claim for Asymptomatic Plaintiffs: Should Illinois Take the Plunge?, 12 DEPAUL 
J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 7 (2009); in the broader toxic tort context: George W.C. McCarter, Medical 
Sue-Veillance: A History and Critique of the Medical Monitoring Remedy in Toxic Tort Litigation, 
45 RUTGERS L. REV. 227 (1993). 
 150.  For an exploration of the variety of remedies employed to achieve medical monitoring, see 
Adam P. Joffe, The Medical Monitoring Remedy: Ongoing Controversy and a Proposed Solution, 84 
CHI. KENT L. REV. 663, 664 (2009). 
 151.  See D. Scott Aberson, A Fifty-state Survey of Medical Monitoring and the Approach the 
Minnesota Supreme Court Should Take When Confronted with the Issue, 32 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1095 (2006). 
 152.  Albeit in a state-court context, Plaintiff requested a unique remedy: “a court-supervised 
medical monitoring program funded by defendant;” the state supreme court found the claim not 
cognizable. Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 714–15 (Mich. 2005). See also Friends for 
All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (using a voucher technique). 
153.  Trahan v. First Nat’l Bank of Ruston, 690 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1982). 
154.  Id. at 466. 
155.  Id. at 467 (“In order to reach this conclusion, we must blow a little dust from some cases 
decided around the turn of the century.”). 
 156.  Id. at 468, quoting O’Toole v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 671 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(cleaned up). 
157.  Id. at 466, 468. 
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within a reasonable time after discovering the conversion.158 The usual 
treatment may stem from the fact that Louisiana maintains a civil law 
system. Still, it is disconcerting that the question presented was how to 
properly measure legal damages for conversion, but the solution appeared 
reminiscent of equity. Would contempt have lied if defendant refused to 
deliver? If so, were there questions of federal equity power unconsidered? 
As the real facts unfolded, by the time Defendant transferred the stocks 
the price had vastly plummeted; the district judge agreed that the remedy 
failed and granted plaintiff’s request for recovery of the earlier value, but 
the appellate court disagreed.159 Maybe a restitution theory would best 
serve Plaintiff if Defendant wrongfully profited upon the initial 
conversion of plaintiff’s security of stock?160 But, under such an unjust 
enrichment claim, the court must again traverse the legal-equitable divide 
regarding a disgorgement of unjust gain remedy. 
B. Punitive Damages Attendant to Equitable Rulings 
For states that have abolished common-law punitive damages,161 a 
federal court sitting in diversity should not award punitive damages. 
Historically, the Court of Chancery did not issue punitive relief because it 
lacked the power: punitive damages exceeded equitable jurisdiction.162 
Yet, since the merger of courts of equity with courts of law, “any civil 
court has the ‘power’ to impose punitive damages.”163 Perhaps as an 
unintended consequence, some courts considering purely equitable claims 
and remedies have imposed punitive damages under a notion of the 
court’s obligation “to afford the plaintiff complete relief.”164 Vindicating 
plaintiff’s claim as well as punishing and deterring tortious behavior may 
warrant a punitive award theoretically. But the standards for state law 
punitive claims are set by the state in question. Constitutional rights to a 
158.  Ahles v. Aztec Enters., Inc., 502 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (App. Div. 1986); Transcon. Oil Corp. 
v. Trenton Prods. Co., 560 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 927(1)(b)
(AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 88, at 1051. 
159.  Trahan v. First Nat’l Bank, 720 F.2d 832, 834, reh’g denied, 724 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1983). 
160.  RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 88, at 1051 Comment 4. 
161.  Id. at 1118 (listing Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Washington as states 
that lack common-law punitive damages, and Nebraska as a state that constitutionally prohibits all 
punitive damages). 
162.  Id. at 168. 
163.  Id. at 399. 
164.  Id.; see, e.g., I.H.P. Corp. v. 210 Cent. Park S. Corp., 189 N.E.2d 812, 812–14 (N.Y. 1963) 
(approving the imposition of punitive damages as incidental to injunctive relief). 
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jury trial remain unless waived.165 Federal courts that award punitives 
attendant to a state common-law claim of a state that does not authorize 
punitive damages166 dishonor Erie, disrespect state preferences, and 
exceed historical federal equity power. 
C. Conflicts and Power Attendant to Contempt Relief 
The arena of contempt raises complex possibilities for conflict 
between federal and state strictures. For example, certain states such as 
California and Texas reject the collateral bar rule in criminal contempt. 
Imagine a diversity-jurisdiction defendant breaches a federal injunction, 
for example an injunction enforcing a covenant not to compete. In 
defendant’s criminal contempt, would the collateral bar rule block the 
merits? One federal judge considered whether a state-court injunction 
would be sheltered by the collateral bar rule in federal habeas corpus and 
decided no.167 
A similar dilemma arises in a state like California that lacks 
compensatory contempt. Imagine a diversity-court defendant violates a 
federal injunction, would the federal judge follow federal compensatory 
contempt or send plaintiff to a second lawsuit for damages? Efficiency 
would be better served by permitting federal compensatory contempt. But 
would the federal court have the power? It fits within the federal 
judiciary’s traditional equity power, but a federal judge would need to 
weigh if use of the power impinged too much on our federalism given 
California’s contra prerogative. 
VII. AN ANALOGY TO THE SUPREME COURT’S ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Thorny issues of federalism are not unique to diversity jurisdiction
cases grappling with the Erie doctrine. Valuable insights lie in examining 
other contexts in which federal courts face tension on choice-of-law 
grounds. A case of original jurisdiction before the United States Supreme 
Court sometimes raise tension between federal power and proper respect 
for state law doctrines. 
 165.  I.H.P. Corp., 189 N.E. at 812–14 (finding Defendants had waived their constitutional rights 
to a jury trial on punitive damages). 
 166.  This statement would not apply to state statutory claims unless the statute fails to authorize 
punitive damages or the state is Nebraska where all punitive damages are prohibited. 
 167.  Pedini v. Bowles, 940 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (N.D. Tex. 1996); see also RENDLEMAN & 
ROBERTS, supra note 88, at 485. 
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For example, in Kansas v. Nebraska,168 a case of original jurisdiction 
rather than diversity, the Supreme Court resolved a provocative remedies 
issue arising from one state’s breach of an interstate water compact.169 
Though state disputes about water rights are generally mundane to 
observers not invested in the particular stakes, Kansas v. Nebraska is 
controversial and groundbreaking.170 It also provides relevant 
considerations toward the delicate federal-state balance Erie seeks to 
foster. 
The most controversial part of the majority’s opinion is the award of 
partial disgorgement in addition to compensation for Nebraska’s breach 
of the compact.171 Kansas alleged, and the Court agreed, that Nebraska 
knowingly breached by consciously disregarding Kansas’s water rights 
under the compact.172 Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, endorsed 
the Special Master’s ruling of $1.8 million in partial disgorgement of 
Nebraska’s ill-gotten gain—over and above an award for Kansas’s $3.7 
million compensatory loss caused by Nebraska’s rerouting of water 
allocated to Kansas.173 Disgorgement of profits as a remedy for 
wrongdoing is not unprecedented, but as a remedy for a breach of compact 
or breach of contract is novel.174 
Justice Thomas wants the application of state contract law175 to 
govern rather than the Court’s vast equitable analysis of the Restatement. 
He asserts that prior cases followed state law rather than reaching toward 
 168.  Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1057 (2015); see also Caprice L. Roberts, Supreme 
Disgorgement, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1413, 1424–26 (2016) (examining the Supreme Court’s disgorgement 
award in Kansas v. Nebraska, a breach of water compact case). 
169.  Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1049. 
 170.  Roberts, Supreme Disgorgement, supra note 168 (analyzing the Court’s reasoning and 
arguing for principled advancement of the law of restitution through the use of its disgorgement 
remedy for opportunistic breaches of contract from public to private settings). 
171.  Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1046, 1059 (granting partial disgorgement of $1.8 million in addition 
to compensatory damages; Nebraska had conceded breach and compensatory harm in the amount of 
$3.7 million for Kansas’s losses). 
172.  Id. at 1051. 
173.  Id. 
174.  Caprice Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement as a Moral Compass for Breach of 
Contract, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 991, 1026 (2009); Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement for 
Opportunistic Breach of Contract and Mitigation of Damages, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 131, 134 (2008). 
Dissenting opinions in Kansas quoted my work regarding the novelty of the remedy to contract law. 
Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the Court 
for exceeding its equitable powers by following the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment and creating a “‘novel extension’ of the law that finds little if any support in case law”); 
id. at 1064–69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (accord).  
 175.  If state law did govern, the Court would need to resolve choice of law questions regarding 
which state’s law should control. Three states were signatories of the original compact. A choice of 
law clause would dictate the determination, if present in the compacts. 
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 11
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss2/11
2018] REMEDIES, EQUITY & ERIE 519 
equitable powers to fill gaps in the law. Justice Thomas’s dissent 
repeatedly emphasizes the importance of honoring state substantive law, 
as a matter of respect for federalism principles and state sovereignty.176 
The purpose of the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the 
Law, upon its founding, was to clarify doctrinal uncertainties by 
pronouncing leading blackletter law.177 The organization has a broader 
mission today: “The American Law Institute is the leading independent 
organization in the United States producing scholarly work to clarify, 
modernize, and improve the law.”178 Of course, it continues to enunciate 
a clear vision of general common law in the subject area.179 
The Kansas majority opinion answers the critique: “Far from 
claiming the power to alter a compact to fit our own views of fairness, we 
insist only upon broad remedial authority to enforce the Compact’s terms 
and deter future violations.”180 
So, although Kansas v. Nebraska is not a diversity jurisdiction case, 
the tension between equity power and state sovereignty over the 
development and application of state law doctrines is palpable. There is 
much we can learn from the discussion so that in future cases we can strike 
the ideal balance of power vis-à-vis federal courts and state law. Ideally, 
the Court could exercise its broad remedial equity power while also 
showing a modicum of comity toward state law prerogatives regarding 
remedy. 
This article affirms that federal courts possess power to apply federal 
procedure for equity but should exercise that power wisely and with 
restraint. Namely, federal courts should use comity toward state variances 
especially where outcome determinative. If the federal court wishes to 
exercise equity power, plaintiff must still establish violation of the 
underlying right. 
 176.  Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1066–67 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“Authority over water is a core attribute of state sovereignty, and ‘[f]ederal courts should pause 
before using their inherent equitable powers to intrude into the proper sphere of the States.’”) (quoting 
his own concurrence in Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131 (1995)).  
 177.  A.L.I., About ALI, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/ [https://perma.cc/CX5N-XREG ] (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2019) (“The Committee recommended that the first undertaking should address 
uncertainty in the law through a restatement of basic legal subjects that would tell judges and lawyers 
what the law was. The formulation of such a restatement thus became ALI’s first endeavor.”). But cf. 
Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the 
American Law Institute for departing from descriptions of the status of blackletter law in favor of 
opting “instead to set forth their aspirations for what the law ought to be”). 
178.  THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 177. 
179.  Id. 
180.  Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1053 n.4. 
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VIII. BENEFITS OF FEDERAL DEVELOPMENT OF EQUITABLE REMEDIES
AND DEFENSES 
A. System of Equity181 
Equity is discrete and valuable, historically and conceptionally.182 
Important principles of equity exist within federal precedents. Equity 
power has a rich history in the federal judiciary; a history worth 
remembering and revisiting. Federal judges should continue to resolve 
vexing questions regarding how to craft equitable remedies and when to 
apply equitable defenses. This article maintains they should do so whether 
the claim is based on federal or state law. Federal equitable doctrines, 
remedies, and defenses are worth saving. Federal judges should exercise 
restraint as they oversee federal equity’s development and refinement. 
B. Promotion of Uniformity 
To the extent that uniformity remains an important goal under Erie 
and beyond, maintaining federal court as an arbiter of proper equitable 
doctrine and scope will help serve uniformity. Of course, complete 
uniformity will remain elusive. For example, a state court hearing an 
identical state-based claim may deny an equitable remedy that a federal 
court sitting in diversity might have granted, and vice versa. Although 
perfect uniformity is not attainable, development of federal equity will 
promote horizontal equity across the federal system whether the claim is 
based on federal or state law. For state-based claims, the substance still 
depends on the state law’s requirements.183 The contours of the 
application of equitable remedies and defenses, however, would rest with 
181.  Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, supra note 59. 
182.  Id. 
 183.  If a state statute dictates or prohibits an equitable remedy for a state statutory claim, it raises 
a more striking conflict for a federal court to disregard state explicit prerogatives. Again, the federal 
court would need to keep apprised of the letter of state law and ensure that the substantive claim is 
proven before any federal equitable remedy could lie. By comparison, a federal court maintains 
equitable discretion to grant or deny relief unless a federal statute clearly and explicitly forecloses 
that discretion. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (ruling that the federal 
judiciary maintained the authority to deny injunctive relief despite violation of a federal statute by the 
U.S. government’s failure to obtain a permit for military test-bombing near Viéques Island off the 
coast of Puerto Rico). Importantly, in the federal system, Congress has the power to curtail federal 
court jurisdiction including narrowing available remedies. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. State 
legislatures have the power to curtail state court jurisdiction, but do not possess such direct authority 
over federal court power. What happens if a state deems its law substantive rather than procedural? 
See Kermit Roosevelt III & Bethan R. Jones, Adrift on Erie: Characterizing Forum Selection Clauses, 
52 AKRON L. REV. 295 (2019) (maintaining every sovereign has the power to determine whether its 
laws are substantive or procedural).  
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the discretion of the federal judge bounded by federal equity doctrines and 
precedent. Federal judges will help shape and refine federal equity 
principles through enunciated reasoning.184 That reasoning will sharpen 
from within federal courts and may influence state court determinations if 
a state court seeks guidance. 
C. Accountability 
Accountability is key. Federal judges have life tenure, but 
accountability in decision making remains through reputation, public 
opinion, and the appellate process. Judges are also bound by institutional 
constraints.185 The more federal judges show their reasoning regarding 
equitable principles the better. Brooding, mystical equity has no place in 
modern law. Well-defined equitable doctrines and boundaries are in high 
demand. Litigants and their counsel will help guide federal court 
development. The appellate process will foster further refinement. 
Scholarly attention to this field will aid maintenance of a healthy system 
of federal equity. 
D. Bounded Discretion 
Discretion is at the heart of equity power. It is also the Achilles’ heel. 
Discretion, if abused, will cause equity’s demise. Judges must use 
restraint in the exercise of discretion to help maintain this important 
power. Restraint includes enunciating equity’s principles more explicitly 
and following them unless there are valid reasons to refine the doctrine. It 
also includes recognizing the historical roots of equity jurisdiction 
authorizing federal courts to act in person on defendants in extraordinary 
ways. With each application of equity, the court must examine the breadth 
and depth of the scope of the remedy or defense. The broader the stroke, 
the more vulnerable to scrutiny the federal judiciary will be. Such power 
may be appropriate, but receptivity will depend on proof of the violated 
right as well as the federal equity precedent for the application. 
 184.  This is an argument in favor of increasing judicial articulation of “reasoned elaboration.” 
HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING 
AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW 143–52 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) 
(theorizing that judges must demonstrate “reasoned elaboration” in opinion writing); see also Roberts, 
Supreme Disgorgement, supra note 168, at 1437, 1440. 
 185.  Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 254–58 (1978) (suggesting 
a certain kind of bounding through a coherent jurisprudence in that judges should decide cases with 
an eye toward crafting a coherent body of precedent); Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 
1325, 1343–44 (1984) (exploring a judge’s duty to maintain continuity). 
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Of course, equity power historically has included flexibility.186 This 
feature at its best is adaptability to new forms of wrongdoing that might 
go unremedied and undeterred if the court were to be overly strict about 
specific methods of wrongdoing.187 At its worst, however, equity becomes 
a shapeshifter that appears manipulable well beyond the scope of the right. 
To exercise equity power wisely, federal courts must show awareness of 
these concerns as well as other potential risks of equity. Ultimately, 
federal judges must balance the benefits accordingly. 
IX. COSTS OF FEDERAL EQUITY
Federal development of equitable doctrines should continue. Still, 
there are dangers inherent in this conclusion. Serious dangers include 
judicial overreaching and federal encroachments on state sovereignty. 
Additional concerns include risks of judicial rigidity of doctrine, which 
dovetails with the risk of exacerbating imperfect and fundamentally 
flawed rulings. Overall, with certain safeguards, the development of 
federal equity is worth the risks. 
A. Judicial Overreaching 
In developing remedies jurisprudence, federal judges may overreach. 
Important criticisms of nationwide injunctions exist.188 Federal judges are 
at the heart of these controversies as the ones who sometimes are issuing 
injunctions benefitting nonparties. Note, however, that the national 
injunction cases arise under federal law,189 so development of federal 
 186.  See, e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329–30 (1944) (describing how flexibility 
rather than rigidity has been the hallmark of equity). 
 187.  GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 471 Definition of 
Constructive Trusts (rev. ed. 1978) (“The court does not restrict itself by describing all the specific 
forms of inequitable holding which will move it to grant relief but rather reserves freedom to apply 
this remedy to whatever knavery human ingenuity can invent.”); see also DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra 
note 90, § 4.1(2); RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 88, at 569–70. 
 188.  See, e.g., Bray, Multiple Chancellors, supra note 59; Amanda Frost, In Defense of 
Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2019); Suzette M. Malveaux, Class 
Actions, Civil Rights, and the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56 (2017); Michael T. 
Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the Lower Courts, 97 
B.U. L. REV. 615 (2017); Wasserman, supra note 86. 
 189.  See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 at *2–*3 (W.D. 
Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (granting an injunction blocking the United States from any enforcement of 
President Trump’s travel ban), stay denied, No. 17–35101, 2017 WL 526497 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2017) 
(per curiam); Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming a similarly broad injunction), 
vacated, 138 S. Ct. 377 (Mem.), remanded to 874 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2017). President Trump altered 
the underlying executive proclamation, mooting cases pending before the Supreme Court. More broad 
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equity has costs beyond the federal-state balance that Erie struck. To the 
extent federal equity is engaging in tightening of equity through additional 
rigors, this danger is slight. 
B. Federalism and State Sovereignty 
Federal judges handling cases that include state law claims must 
remain aware of state law prerogatives. A remedy may not issue without 
the establishment of a proven right. For cases in diversity, this means that 
plaintiff must meet state law thresholds for the right, though standards for 
any equitable remedy derive primarily from the federal court’s precedent. 
This balance may be tricky with equitable remedies such as 
preliminary injunctions that precede full trials on the merits. For example, 
in such moments, federal procedure would govern the quantum of proof 
for the likelihood of success on the merits, and federal equity principles 
would govern whether access to the remedy ultimately should lie under 
the court’s equity power. The assessment of the merits themselves, 
however, would still be on the underlying state law creating the 
substantive claim. 
This may result in a plaintiff or defendant forum shopping. Parties 
forum shop for all sorts of reasons. Empirical works beyond the scope of 
this article may shed light on the level and motivations behind such 
choices. On whole, however, it is more likely that litigants prefer certain 
districts (or particular judges) within the federal system than litigants 
viewing the entire federal system as more or less lenient on remedies than 
the whole state system. Still, assuming that some litigants may seek a 
federal forum purely to get a more favorable reception for an equitable 
remedy (or defense), why shouldn’t the issuing federal court—subject to 
appellate review within the federal system—control whether it will lend 
its equitable hand to securing the right at stake? 
No doubt, allowing federal courts to continue to plow the fields of 
equity comes with risks. It is critical to be mindful of the risks and vigilant 
with critiques. For better or worse, federal opinions garner more visibility. 
This phenomenon will help ensure accountability and, ideally, course 
correction. 
injunctions followed in this area and other arenas. The ultimate fate of this type of injunction is 
unknown. 
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C. Risk of Rigidity 
In certain areas, the Supreme Court, in particular, has developed 
what may be overly rigid doctrines of equity. The Court may well be 
responding to perceived criticisms regarding the unmoored nature of 
equity. For example, if one views equity as subjective fairness, then there 
is a risk of favoritism and bias. A rational response is to show that equity 
follows the law.190 This notion means both that equity can go nowhere 
without respecting the underlying right, but it also connotes that equity 
follows principles, doctrines, and precedent. 
Accordingly, it makes sense that one who cares about restoration of 
respect for equity and equitable remedies might reinstate an overt 
formalism.191 This path appears to be Justice Thomas’s approach to 
remedies and equity. It is commendable, although it may be imperfect and 
overly rigid in certain arenas. Dictating strict adherence to four-factor 
tests for preliminary or permanent injunctions may strangle lower federal 
court good-faith developments. 
For example, the Supreme Court’s accidental revolution with eBay 
struck a wise blow to unelucidated, categorial federal equity rulings. But 
it may have swung the pendulum too far the other direction by stifling the 
ability to have variation in accomplishing the same goals. In other words, 
lower federal courts may honor equity’s overarching requirements for 
exercise of equity power, but they may execute equity in a variety of ways. 
This experimentation may remain necessary, especially across different 
substantive areas—pursuant to both state and federal law claims. For 
instance, there were historic reasons why injunctions sought in certain 
substantive areas were disfavored and garnered heightened burdens.192 
There may also be valid reasons for sliding scales.193 
 190.  JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ADAPTED FOR ALL THE STATES, AND TO THE UNION OF LEGAL AND 
EQUITABLE REMEDIES UNDER THE REFORMED PROCEDURE, Vol. I, § 363 (John Norton Pomeroy, Jr., 
ed., 4th ed. 1918) (detailing equity’s maxims); see also RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 88, at 
425 (exploring the same).  
 191.  See Ernest A. Young, Erie as a Way of Life, 52 AKRON L. REV. 193 (2019). (Professor 
Young eloquently defended Erie’s command and suggested a renewed interest in legal formalism.) 
 192.  See, e.g., O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 975 
(10th Cir. 2004) (en banc). The Supreme Court affirmed the decision without elucidation on the 
preliminary injunction standard. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 
U.S. 418 (2006). 
 193.  See, e.g., Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 
F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 2010) (applying a sliding-scale test); cf. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 75 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (explaining the historical and policy rationale for presumptions and sliding scales in the 
Second Circuit, but declaring that the injunction standard of eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 
388, 390 (2006), extends to preliminary injunctions in the copyright context). 
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It remains unclear as to whether this type of alternative reasoning 
may persist post eBay and Winter. Justice Ginsburg maintains that the 
Supreme Court has not outlawed the use of such variations.194 Her 
remarks came in dissent, though powerful on the need for flexibility in 
interpreting equity’s standards to remain.195 In a section aptly titled, 
“Flexibility is a hallmark of equity jurisdiction[,]” Justice Ginsburg 
explained that “[t]he essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of 
the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of 
the particular case.”196 Accordingly, the distinguishing characteristic is 
“[f]lexibility rather than rigidity.”197 In Justice Ginsburg’s assessment, 
equity permits balancing considerations in varied ways: 
Consistent with equity’s character, courts do not insist that litigants 
uniformly show a particular, predetermined quantum of probable 
success or injury before awarding equitable relief. Instead, courts have 
evaluated claims for equitable relief on a “sliding scale,” sometimes 
awarding relief based on a lower likelihood of harm when the likelihood 
of success is very high.198 
Justice Ginsburg’s reasoning is compelling, but it has not garnered 
explicit adoption by the majority of the Court. Thus, the continued validity 
of variations remains unclear. The Court’s explicit repetition of rote 
factors as the sole historical factors to be analyzed systematically causes 
a perception of extreme rigidity. Such rigidity may also stifle state court 
considerations.199 The Supreme Court would be wise to reflect on overly 
rigid equity pronouncement so as not to foreclose avenues that foster 
valuable balancing between protection of rights and abuses of equity 
power. 
 194.  Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 51 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This 
Court has never rejected that formulation, and I do not believe it does so today.”). 
195.  Id.  
196.  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312); Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 329 
197.  Id. (quoting Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312); Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 329. 
198.  Id. (emphasis added) (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 11A FED. PRAC. & PROC.: FED. 
RULES OF CIV. PROC. § 2948.3 (West 2018)). 
 199.  With respect to state court forums, note that there is a way to interpret federal law to allow 
states to apply their own procedure when an injunction sought in state court touches on federal law. 
Also, states remain free to apply their own procedures to requests for equitable remedies under state-
based causes of action. See, e.g., InnoSys, Inc. v. Mercer, 364 P.3d 1013, 1020 (Utah 2015). Cf. 
Morley, supra note 3, at 220 (maintaining state courts should have the authority to form its own 
equitable doctrines that apply “equally” in both state and federal court). 
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D. Risk of Imperfection 
Just because federal courts have the power to develop equity 
jurisprudence for remedies, does not mean they will always get it right. 
For example, assume the Supreme Court develops federal principles for 
equitable remedies in flawed ways. The Court has imperfectly and rigidly 
declared the uniformity of the equitable test for preliminary and 
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permanent injunctions.200 It has slipped in other arenas as well including 
contempt,201 disgorgement,202 restitution,203 and more.204 
 200.  See, e.g., Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. 
MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63, 73, 76–77, 80 (2008); Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry 
E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 203, 206–19 (2012) (examining multiple lower courts across the circuits that viewed 
eBay as altering traditional approaches). Federal courts are split on the extent to which they retain 
discretion to vary injunction standards. Compare Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(under federal question jurisdiction under the Copyright Act, the Second Circuit determines that it 
will follow eBay and Winter rather than its circuit precedent with long history of granting such 
preliminary injunctions to protect against copyright infringement), with Citigroup Glob. Mkts, 598 
F.3d at 34 (in which the Second Circuit maintained a sliding scale methodology for injunction 
determinations).  
 201.  The Supreme Court grappled with a tough issue over whether massive monetary contempt 
fines ($52 million) amounted to criminal rather than civil coercive contempt. Int’l Union, United Mine 
Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994). The Court ruled the serious fines were criminal and thus 
required higher procedural standards. Id. at 824–38. This determination is defensible, and one would 
want to err on that side in the case of a close call. That said, a strange procedural wrinkle may 
demonstrate incomplete logic. The parties to the litigation had settled; the strike had ended and thus 
the behavior ceased. Id. at 825. The only contempt amount in question, the $52 million, was an amount 
the circuit judge had ordered defendant to pay a non-party (certain counties and the Commonwealth 
of Virginia). The circuit judge had appointed a Special Commissioner, Bagwell, to collect the unpaid 
contempt amount. The Virginia intermediate appellate court accepted the parties’ settlement and 
would have dismissed the whole matter, but the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the contempt award 
in favor of Bagwell. This posture demonstrates why the Virginia Supreme Court should have vacated 
the fines upon the parties’ requests, if indeed the contempt was civil, and why that court’s insistence 
on keeping the fines to protect the court show the public purpose and therefore additional reasoning 
for determination that the fine was criminal. Id. at 847–48 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Further, to what 
extent, should the case have continued up the chain to the Supreme Court if the only interest involved 
a nonparty? There are other worthy questions regarding federal court power to issue equitable relief 
that inures to the benefit of nonparties. Courts have also done similar maneuvers when routing part 
of punitive recoveries to state entities, though this result is usually by virtue of state statutes (Oregon 
for example). 
 202.  Roberts, supra note 168, at 1431–35 & 1437–38 (criticizing the arbitrary and 
overcompensatory aspects of the Court’s endorsement of the Special Master’s determination of the 
amount of disgorgement and permitting its recovery along with compensatory damages). In the 
intellectual property area, the Supreme Court continues to spark controversy regarding the use, scope, 
and classification of disgorgement as legal versus equitable. See Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 
137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) (interpreting statutory authorization to disgorge a design-patent infringer’s 
“total profit.”); see also Mark Gergen & Pamela Samuelson, The Disgorgement Remedy of Design 
Patent Law, 108 CALIF. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2020) (articulating limits of causation and 
apportionment to define proper scope of the total-profits disgorgement remedy for fragmented designs 
in design patent law), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3353536. 
 203.  See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of 
Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003); see also RENDLEMAN 
& ROBERTS, supra note 88, at 406–08.  
 204.  For example, a possible regrettable course might be the hard shift away from a functional 
test of the legal or equitable nature of remedies sought, see, e.g., Wooddell v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. 
Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93, 97 (1991); Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local 391 v. Terry, 
494 U.S. 558, 572–80 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring), to a much more historical emphasis in the 
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A stark example is Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond 
Fund, Inc.205 Justice Scalia held that a federal court lacked power to issue 
an asset freeze injunction206 because the court did not possess proper 
equity jurisdiction for this particular remedy historically.207 He reasoned 
that historic authority was lacking: “[T]he equitable powers conferred by 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not include the power to create remedies 
previously unknown to equity jurisprudence.”208 This rigid view is overly 
constrained, as Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion maintained.209 
Justice Ginsburg asserted that federal equity jurisdiction is instead flexible 
and develops over time.210 Absent a legislative prohibition, Justice 
Ginsburg argued that federal courts possessed the power to issue asset 
freeze injunctions.211 The Erie issue had not arisen in the lower federal 
court, and the Court declined to consider it on appeal. 
Imperfections in classifications and reasoning may well continue. On 
balance, however, it is worth maintaining a federal system of equitable 
principles despite the risks. Ideally, a system that develops in a flexible 
yet principled fashion. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Federal equity power in fashioning remedies is worth maintaining. 
Erie generally dictates that federal courts sitting in diversity follow state 
substantive law. The Supreme Court also carved inartful inroads regarding 
equity. Such inroads established a pathway for federal courts to execute 
equity pursuant to traditional principles, even when resolving state 
substantive claims. The passage of time, the merger of law and equity, and 
fear of abuses endanger equity’s future. But equitable remedies and 
defenses, issued by federal courts sitting in diversity, remain vital to the 
protection of state-based rights pursued in federal court. Federal equity 
power cannot be boundless. Rather, federal courts must continue to 
examination of the federal constitutional right to a jury trial, as implemented in Feltner v. Columbia 
Pictures Television, 523 U.S. 340 (1998) (Thomas, J.). 
205.  Grupo Mexicano de DeSarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999) (5-
4). 
206.  A preliminary injunction ordering a party not to dispose of assets pending adjudication. 
 207.  Id. at 318–29. “We must ask, therefore, whether the relief respondents requested here was 
traditionally accorded by courts of equity.” Id. at 319. 
208.  Id. at 332. State courts, however, are not bound to follow the Court’s view of federal court 
power. Scratch Golf Co. v. Dunes W. Residential Golf Prop., Inc., 603 S.E.2d 905 (S.C. 2004); 
Grosshuesch v. Cramer, 623 S.E.2d 833 (S.C. 2005). 
209.  Grupo, 527 U.S. at 333 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
210.  Id. at 336 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
211.  Id. at 342 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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develop and apply equity principles, but they must do so in a manner that 
demonstrates principled discretion in crafting remedies doctrines that 
balance the litigants, underlying rights, and state prerogatives. Federal 
judges must enunciate, clear reasoning to restore the best of equity’s 
traditions of justice with an eye toward satisfying doctrinal requirements. 
If all that results is no more predictable than one Chancellor’s foot, then 
federal courts will not have succeeded in this vital task. Instead, may 
equity continue to flourish with the wise exercise of federal judicial power 
and restraint. 
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